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Abstract
An established result of the endogenous growth literature is that laissez-faire equilibria
in expanding-varieties models are suboptimal due to the rent-e¤ect: monopolistic pricing
drives the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate input below the e¢ cient level, imply-
ing that it is optimal to subsidize nal producers. This paper shows that, if scale e¤ects
are eliminated by introducing R&D spillovers, normative prescriptions change. Since the
laissez-faire economy under-invests into R&D activity, the share of resources devoted to
intermediatesproduction increases and this reallocation e¤ect contrasts the rent-e¤ect. In
many scenarios, including the polar case of logarithmic preferences, the reallocation e¤ect
surely dominates. The equilibrium quantity of each intermediate exceeds the optimal level
and the optimal policy consists of taxing, instead of subsidizing nal producers because
scal authorities must redirect the extra-output generated by under-investment towards
R&D activity.
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1 Introduction
An important strand of the endogenous growth literature emphasizes the role of R&D activity
as a crucial source of sustained economic development. In this framework, horizontal (vertical)
innovations improve the quantity (quality) of intermediate inputs, and productivity growth
results from endogenous technical change. After the seminal contributions of Romer (1987;
1990), most models of R&D-based growth share a typical structure comprising three core sec-
tors: nal producers, usually assumed to be perfectly competitive and acting as price-takers; a
nite mass of monopolistic rms producing di¤erentiated intermediates; and an R&D sector,
developing blueprints of new types of intermediates to be exploited by incumbent monopolists.
In this framework, the role of monopolistic competition is relevant in two respects. On the
one hand, the possibility of earning monopoly rents represents a crucial incentive to innovate.
On the other hand, monopolistic markets generate ine¢ cient allocations under laissez-faire
conditions. The second characteristic implies that decentralizing e¢ cient and socially-optimal
paths in these market economies requires active public intervention. In order to obtain a pos-
itive mark-up, monopolists restrict supply, and the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate
employed in nal production is ine¢ ciently low. This is a standard rent-e¤ect, which implies
that restoring e¢ ciency requires subsidizing the purchases of intermediates of nal producers.
The optimality of subsidies to nal producers has been established in various contexts. Two
useful references are the lab-equipment models with expanding-varieties presented in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.285-300) and in Acemoglu (2009: p.433-444) respectively based
on Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). One aspect that appears neglected,
however, is the robustness of this result to alternative specications of the R&D technology
that drives economic growth. In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Acemoglu (2009), the
optimality of subsidies to nal producers is formally proved under the assumption that the
instantaneous increase in the number of varieties of intermediate products is in xed proportion
with the absolute level of R&D expenditures. This characteristic, however, implies that the
model displays pure scale e¤ects: the equilibrium growth rate is proportional to the number
of workers employed in nal production, which coincides with the population size. For this
reason, we will henceforth label this framework as the Multi-sector Scale Model (MS-model).
The presence of scale e¤ects in endogenous growth models has been criticized on empirical
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grounds (e.g. Backus et al. 1992), and the subsequent literature showed that scale e¤ects
can be eliminated by means of alternative assumptions.1 A rst approach is that followed by
semi-endogenous growth models (Jones, 1995; Kortum, 1997; Segerstrom, 1998), postulating a
non-linear relation between the growth rate of the mass of varieties and the employment level
in the R&D sector. In this case, population size only has scale e¤ects on aggregate income
levels. A second class of models, developed by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Peretto
(1998) and Young (1998), assumes that research can increase either productivity within a
product line or the total number of available products. The mixed dimension of horizontal
and vertical innovations implies that the market structure can absorb scale e¤ects  e.g.
because the increase in the number of rms makes each rm more specialized, and the higher
technological distance reduces the spillovers among rms (Peretto and Smulders, 2002). A
third way to eliminate scale e¤ects is to extend the MS-model by including a linear relation
between the growth rate of intermediatesvarieties and the rate of R&D investment, measured
by the ratio between R&D expenditures and aggregate output. For expositional clarity, we
will henceforth refer to this assumption as the linear-rate law. This solution is mentioned in
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.300-302), and features two desirable properties. On the one
hand, it eliminates scale e¤ects since the economys growth rate depends on the population
growth rate but not on population size. On the other hand, it is consistent with the empirical
observation that productivity growth appears positively related to the ratio between R&D
expenditures and output with a relatively stable coe¢ cient.
Focusing on the third approach, it may be stressed that the existing literature does not
provide a detailed discussion of optimal policies in the presence of linear-rate laws. However,
depending on the way in which the linear-rate law is introduced in the model, the welfare
properties of the laissez-faire equilibrium are substantially modied. In particular, if the
structural assumptions of the MS-model are maintained, the linear-rate law has to be recon-
ciled with zero-prot conditions in the R&D sector, which suggests introducing externalities
in R&D activity. This assumption is conceptually similar to that underlying the analysis of
Lucas (1988), where human capital drives growth but does not imply scale e¤ects because the
productivity of individual knowledge depends on the average human capital in the society. In
the multi-sector framework with expanding varieties, an analogous specication is that the
1See Jones (1999) for a detailed discussion.
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marginal productivity of R&D expenditures taken as given at the rm level increases with
the state of technology determined by previous R&D e¤orts. If the productivity of current
research is positively a¤ected by the results of past research, a linear accumulation law arises
at the aggregate level. The crucial point is that, given the presence of dynamic externalities,
the welfare properties of the decentralized equilibrium di¤er from those predicted by the MS-
model. This paper analyzes the policy implications of the interplay between the rent-e¤ect and
the linear-rate law generated by R&D spillovers.2 In particular, we study a Linear-Rate Model
which maintains all the assumptions of the benchmark MS-model except for the presence of
externalities in the R&D technology.
The present analysis yields three main results. First, the structure of the Linear-Rate
model implies that laissez-faire equilibria exhibit a reallocation e¤ect with respect to socially-
optimal allocations. On the one hand, the laissez-faire economy under-invests in R&D activity,
which is not surprising: since private agents do not fully internalize the positive side-e¤ects
of current research on future productivity growth, R&D activity is ine¢ ciently low. On the
other hand, this misallocation of resources has a specic consequence: a low fraction of output
invested in R&D activity implies a greater share directed towards the production of inter-
mediates. Since this mechanism tends to raise the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate
input, the reallocation e¤ect contrasts the rent-e¤ect mentioned above. More precisely: in the
laissez-faire economy of the Linear-Rate model, the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate
tends to be reduced by monopolistic pricing but, at the same time, tends to be increased by
the misallocation of resources in disfavor of R&D activity.
The question that naturally arises is which of the two e¤ects dominates. In this regard,
our second result is that, in the polar case with logarithmic preferences, the reallocation e¤ect
always dominates, generating overshooting in intermediates production. This result is in
contrast with the predictions of the MS-model, where the (i) rent-e¤ect is the only market
failure, (ii) equilibrium quantities of intermediates are ine¢ ciently low, and (iii) restoring
2For reasons of expositional clarity, the present analysis follows the standard specication of the lab-
equipment model with Cobb-Douglas technology. When R&D spillovers are sector-specic and technologies
exhibit a substitution elasticity di¤erent from unity, the stability and existence properties of equilibrium paths
may be altered substantially, as shown in Doi and Mino (2005). Addressing these issues is however beyond the
scope of the present analysis, which focuses on the optimal taxation of nal producers.
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e¢ ciency requires subsidizing nal producers. The Linear-Rate model analyzed here, instead,
establishes that with unit-elasticity preferences, the optimal policy consists of taxing nal
producers.
The third result of the analysis relates to the robustness of the overshooting e¤ect and of
the associated normative prescription. Relaxing the assumption of logarithmic preferences,
it is shown that the reallocation e¤ect arising in the laissez-faire economy is strengthened
(weakened) by higher (lower) values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, denoted
by 1=. In particular, the reallocation e¤ect surely dominates if the elasticity is above or
equal to unity: when   1, the overshooting result is reinforced and the optimal tax on
nal producers is strictly positive. When  > 1, instead, it possible that the elasticity of
substitution overcomes a critical threshold whereby the reallocation e¤ect is very weak and
dominated by the rent-e¤ect. In this case, intermediatesproduction is ine¢ ciently low and
the nal sector should be subsidized, although the optimal subsidy rate will be smaller than
that predicted by the MS-model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the linear-rate law in the bench-
mark model with expanding varieties. Section 3 analyzes market equilibria with and without
public intervention. Section 4 derives the socially-optimal allocation by solving a standard
centralized problem, and claries the di¤erences between the market failures arising in the
present model relative to the MS-model. Section 5 derives the main results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 The Decentralized Economy
In order to facilitate the comparison with the MS-model, our set-up follows closely the most
popular version of the lab-equipment model. In particular, the market structure and the
assumptions regarding rms and households behavior, described in section 2.1, are identical
to those made in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.285-300) and Acemoglu (2009: p.433-
444). The analysis di¤ers in the specication of the dynamic law governing the growth rate
of intermediatesvarieties: this modication is introduced in section 2.2. In order to discuss
optimal policies, the market economy also includes a scal authority that subsidizes R&D
investment and may tax or subsidize the purchase of intermediate inputs by nal producers.
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The laissez-faire equilibrium is obtained as a special case of this more general decentralized
equilibrium. For the sake of comparability, we initially assume that nal producerspurchases
of inputs are subsidized at rate b: the normative prediction of the MS-model is that the nal
sector should be subsidized due to the rent-e¤ect, so that the optimal subsidy rate is b > 0.
The present analysis shows that in the Linear-Rate model, instead, nal producers should be
taxed under many circumstances, so that the optimal subsidy rate b may well be strictly
negative.
2.1 Firms and Households Behavior
Final Sector. Output consists of a single consumption good produced under constant returns
to scale. The whole sector can be thus represented as a single competitive rm producing
output by means of J varieties of di¤erentiated intermediate products, indexed by j 2 [0; J ],
and labor. The technology is
Y (t) = L (t)1 
Z J(t)
0
x (j; t) dj;  2 (0; 1) ; (1)
where t 2 [0;1) is the time index, Y (t) is the quantity of output, L (t) is the number of
workers and x (j; t) is the quantity of the j-th variety of intermediate input employed (and
destroyed) in production. The mass of varieties at time zero is given, J (0) = J0 > 0, and
may increase over time due to R&D activity that provides endogenous technological progress
in the form of varieties expansion. Each household supplies one unit of labor inelastically, so
that L (t) equals population size. Denoting by ` > 0 the constant population growth rate, we
have L (t) = L0e`t. The government subsidizes the purchase of each intermediate good b (j; t):
in order to focus on symmetric equilibria, we set a constant subsidy rate for each variety
b (j; t) = b, which may be positive or negative. Denoting the wage rate by w (t) and the price
of the j-th intermediate by p (j; t), the prot-maximizing conditions imply
w (t) = (1  )Y (t) =L (t) ; (2)
p (j; t) = b+ L (t)1  x (j; t) 1 : (3)
Each variety of intermediate input is produced by a monopolist who holds the relevant patent.
As a consequence, the demand schedule (3) is taken as given by each intermediate producer.
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Intermediate Sector. The j-th monopolist maximizes instantaneous prots
 (j; t) = p (j; t)x (j; t)  x (j; t)
subject to (3), where  is a constant marginal cost applying to each variety. The rst-order
conditions yield the pricing rule
p (j; t) =
  b (1  )

(4)
for each j 2 [0; J ], implying that prots and produced quantities are symmetric across varieties:
x (j; t) = x (t) =

2= (  b) 11  L (t) (5)
 (j; t) =  (t) =
(  b) (1  )

x (t) : (6)
Notice that substituting (5) in (1) we obtain
Y (t) =

2= (  b) 1  L (t) J (t) ; (7)
which shows that output is linear in the number of varieties of intermediate products as well
as in population size.
R&D Sector. The mass of monopolistic rms increases over time by virtue of R&D activ-
ity pursued by competitive rms. In each instant t, the number of varieties of intermediate
products increases as R&D rms develop new blueprints and sell the relevant patent to an
incumbent monopolist. The symmetric equilibrium in the monopolistic sector allows us to
represent R&D rms as a consolidated R&D sector earning zero prots due to perfect compe-
tition and free-entry. Developing blueprints requires R&D investment and, in the aggregate,
the innovation frontier is represented by the linear technology
_J (t) =  (t)Z (t) ; (8)
where Z (t) is aggregate R&D expenditure in the economy, and  (t) is the marginal pro-
ductivity of investment, taken as given at the rm level. Each R&D rm receives a subsidy
to investment at constant rate a > 0, so that aggregate R&D expenditure consists of total
expenditure of rms, denoted by z (t), plus total government spending az (t). We thus have
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Z (t) = z (t) (1 + a). Denoting by V (t) the value of each patent, the zero-prot condition is3
V (t) = 1= [ (t) (1 + a)] : (9)
The value of each patent sold to an incumbent producer equals the present value of future
monopoly prots. This implies the standard no-arbitrage condition
i (t) =
 (t)
V (t)
+
_V (t)
V (t)
; (10)
where i (t) is the equilibrium interest rate yielded by private investment.
Government. The public sector nances total expenditures by means of a lump-sum tax
f (t) imposed on each household. Ruling out public debt, we set
az (t) + bJ (t)x (t) = f (t)L (t) (11)
in order to have balanced budget in each instant.
Households. The economy is populated by L (t) identical households. Individual private
wealth consists of a fraction 1=L (t) of the N (t) total assets in the economy, representing
shares of owned rms. Denoting assets per capita by n (t)  N (t) =L (t), the individual
wealth constraint reads
_n (t) = (i (t)  `)n (t) + w (t)  c (t)  f (t) ; (12)
where c (t) is individual consumption. The objective of the representative agent born in instant
t = 0 is to maximize the present-value utility stream
U0 
Z 1
0
e tu (c (t)) dt =
Z 1
0
e t
c (t)1    1
1   dt (13)
where  > 0 is the time-preference rate, and u (c) is the iso-elastic instantaneous utility
function with  > 0. As shown in the Appendix, the maximization of U0 subject to (12)
requires satisfying the transversality condition
lim
t!1N (t) e
  R t0 i(s)ds = lim
t!1J (t)V (t) e
  R t0 i(s)ds = 0; (14)
3Aggregate prots of the R&D sector equal V (t) _J (t) Z (t) = V (t)  (t) z (t) (1 + a) z (t), so that condition
(9) maximizes R&D prots for a given marginal productivity  (t), and implies zero prots for each rm. The
same condition is equivalently obtained assuming free entry in the R&D business for an indenite number of
rms, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: Ch.6).
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and the rst-order conditions yield the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule _c (t) =c (t) =  1 (i (t)    `).
Aggregating across households, consumption growth is given by
_C (t)
C (t)
=
1

[i (t)    (1  ) `] ; (15)
where C (t)  L (t) c (t) is aggregate consumption. Since the total value of assets in the
economy equals the value of rms, L (t)n (t) = J (t)V (t), equation (12) and the previous
relations imply the aggregate constraint of the economy (see Appendix)
Y (t) = C (t) + Z (t) + J (t)x (t) ; (16)
which shows that total output equals aggregate consumption plus total R&D expenditures
plus the cost of producing intermediates in each instant.
2.2 Spillovers in the R&D sector
All the assumptions reported in section 2.1 coincide with those made in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004: p.285-300) and Acemoglu (2009: p.433-444). The distinction between the Multi-
sector Scale Model and the Linear-Rate Model is exclusively based on di¤erent specications
of the marginal productivity of investment - that is  (t) in equation (8) - which is taken as
given at the rm level.
If we set  (t) equal to an exogenous constant, say  > 0, we obtain the MS-model. In this
case, the free-entry condition imposes that the patent value equals the true net cost of R&D,
and the mass of varieties is in xed proportion with R&D expenditure:
_J (t) = Z (t) :
In this paper, we specify a di¤erent innovation frontier. Suppose that the marginal productiv-
ity of investment  (t) is a¤ected by spillovers whereby the productivity of past research e¤orts
increases that of current activity. In the modern growth literature, this type of spillovers are
usually formalized as knowledge-stock externalities. For example, models with human capital
à la Lucas (1988) incorporate an un-compensated transmission across generations induced by
public knowledge. The equivalent assumption in the present context is that the R&D activity
of each rm is more productive the better the current state of technology attained by virtue of
previous research. This concept of state-of-the-art in research can be conveniently measured
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by the ratio between the number of existing varieties and current output levels, J (t) =Y (t).
Formally, we set
 (t)    J (t) =Y (t) (17)
where  > 0 is a constant proportionality factor representing the intensity of the external-
ity. Equation (17) implies that the growth rate of intermediatesvarieties increases with the
economy-wide rate of R&D investment: from (8), we have
_J (t) =J (t) =   (Z (t) =Y (t)) : (18)
Following the denitions given in the Introduction, equation (18) is a linear-rate law. As
mentioned in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.300-302), linear-rate laws like (18) generally
exhibit two desirable properties. First, they eliminate scale e¤ects by making the equilibrium
growth rate of output independent of the population size. Second, they t the data better than
the MS-model since, in most industrialized countries, the growth rate of productivity appears
to be positively related to the ratio between R&D expenditures and output, with a propor-
tionality coe¢ cient here represented by  that is relatively stable over time. The following
analysis will show that there exists a third, welfare-related implication. When the linear law
(18) is obtained by postulating spillover e¤ects in the R&D sector, as we do here, there exists
a reallocation e¤ect whereby a market economy under laissez-faire may over-produce each in-
termediate input as a result of sub-optimal R&D investment. This point has not been stressed
in the literature so far but it is relevant from a policy-making perspective: despite the fact
that intermediate inputs yield positive monopoly rents, the equilibrium quantity sold on the
market may exceed the socially-optimal level. If this is the case, restoring e¢ ciency requires
taxing, and not subsidizing, nal producers.
The remainder of the analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we characterize the decen-
tralized equilibrium. Second, we identify the socially-optimal allocation with the solution of
a standard centralized problem. Third, we characterize the optimal policy by deriving the
levels of the subsidy rates that decentralize the optimum in the market economy with public
intervention. The following sections analyze each point in turn.
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3 Decentralized Equilibria
3.1 General Characteristics
The equilibrium quantities in the decentralized market economy will be denoted by superscript
E. As shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium is characterized by a constant rate of return
to R&D activity, and therefore by balanced growth in each point in time:
Proposition 1 In the decentralized equilibrium, the consumption propensity E  CE=Y E,
the investment rate  E  ZE=Y E, and the interest rate iE are constant over time:
E = 1  
  b
2   1

[(1 + a)  (1  )  (=)] ; (19)
 E =
1

[(1 + a)  (1  )  (=)] ; (20)
iE =  (1 + a)  (1  ) + `: (21)
The economy follows a balanced growth path along which
_CE (t)
CE (t)
=
_ZE (t)
ZE (t)
=
_Y E (t)
Y E (t)
=
1

[ (1 + a)  (1  ) + `  ] ; (22)
_JE (t)
JE (t)
=  E =
1

[ (1 + a)  (1  )  ] : (23)
in each t 2 [0;1). (Proof: see Appendix)
The absence of transitional dynamics hinges on the same mechanism of the MS-model:
from (7), equilibrium output is linear in the growth rate of varieties. Di¤erently from the MS-
model, however, there are no scale e¤ects: from (22), the equilibrium growth rate is not a¤ected
by population size L (t). Expression (21) shows that the equilibrium rate of return increases
with the spillover parameter , which determines the productivity of R&D expenditures, and
with the associated subsidy rate a. The subsidy on the purchases of intermediate inputs,
instead, does not yield growth e¤ects: an increase in b reduces the consumption propensity
(19) but does not modify expressions (22)-(23). The main role of this subsidy is to raise the
equilibrium quantity of each intermediate product which, from (5), equals
xE (t) =

2= (  b) 11  L0e`t: (24)
On the basis of the above results, the laissez-faire equilibrium can be characterized as follows.
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3.2 Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
Ruling out public intervention, consider the market economy previously described without
taxes and subsidies, and set a = b = f (t) = 0 in each instant. Denoting the equilibrium
quantities under laissez-faire by superscript F, Proposition 1 implies that the consumption
propensity F  CF =Y F , the investment rate  F  ZF =Y F , and the interest rate iF are
constant over time, and equal to
F = 1  2   1

[ (1  )  (=)] ; (25)
 F =
1

[ (1  )  (=)] ; (26)
iF =  (1  ) + `; (27)
and the economy follows a balanced growth path along which
_CF (t)
CF (t)
=
_ZF (t)
ZF (t)
=
_Y F (t)
Y F (t)
=
1

[ (1  ) + `  ] ; (28)
_JF (t)
JF (t)
=  F =
1

[ (1  )  ] : (29)
in each t 2 [0;1). Moreover, from (24), the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate product
equals
xF (t) =
 
2=
 1
1  L0e
`t: (30)
As regards the existence of the equilibrium, there are standard restrictions to be imposed on
parameters. In particular, the equilibrium is well-dened if and only if parameters satisfy
 (1  ) > ; (31)
since otherwise the investment rate would be non-positive.4
As noted before, the laissez-faire equilibrium is ine¢ cient for two independent reasons.
First, monopolistic competition in the intermediate sector introduces a wedge between the
price and the marginal cost of di¤erentiated inputs. Second, spillovers in R&D activity are
not internalized by atomistic agents. The interplay between the two market failures implies
that the allocation achieved by the laissez-faire economy di¤ers from the socially-optimal one
i.e., the allocation that would be chosen by a benevolent utilitarian planner endowed with
perfect foresight. The social optimum is briey described below.
4 If  >  (1  ), equation (26) implies a negative investment rate  F 6 0 and equation (29) yields a
negative growth rate of varieties  F 6 0.
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4 Social Optimality
4.1 The Centralized Problem
Consider the social problem solved by a hypothetical central planner endowed with perfect
foresight and full control over the allocation. The objective is to maximize the utilitarian
social welfare function
W 
Z 1
0
L (t)u (C (t) =L (t)) e (+`)tdt =
Z 1
0
c (t)1    1
1   L (t) e
 (+`)tdt; (32)
where the instantaneous welfare function is the sum the utilities of all households in each point
in time, and the social discount rate (+ `) embodies the necessary adjustment for population
growth. The maximization is subject to the aggregate constraints of the economy studied in
the previous section, which can be written as
c (t)L (t) = (1   (t))L (t)1 
Z J(t)
0
x (j; t) dj   
Z J(t)
0
x (j; t) dj; (33)
_J (t) = J (t) (t) : (34)
Equation (33) is the aggregate constraint (16), where we have substituted the investment rate
 (t)  Z (t) =Y (t) and technology (1): aggregate consumption equals the un-invested fraction
of output minus the total cost of producing intermediates. Equation (34) is the dynamic law
governing varietiesexpansion (18): the use of this constraint implicitly postulates that the
existence of R&D spillovers is known to the optimizer. The social planner chooses the sequence
of consumption, quantities of intermediates and investment rates using fc (t) ; x (j; t) ;  (t)g1t=0
as control variables. The number of varieties J (t) is the state variable, with given initial
condition J0 > 0. As shown in the Appendix, the optimality conditions imply balanced
growth from time zero onwards. Denoting optimal quantities by superscript ?, we have the
following
Proposition 2 In the social optimum, the consumption propensity ?  C?=Y ? and the
investment rate  ? (t)  Z?=Y ? are constant over time and equal to
? = (1  )   (   1) + 
 (   ) ; (35)
 ? =
 (1  )  
 (   ) ; (36)
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where  >  must hold to have a well-dened equilibrium. The economy follows a balanced
growth path where
_C? (t)
C? (t)
=
_Z? (t)
Z? (t)
=
_Y ? (t)
Y ? (t)
=
1

f [1   (1   ?)] + `  g (37)
_J? (t)
J? (t)
=  ? =
 (1  )  
    : (38)
in each t 2 [0;1). (Proof: see Appendix)
The existence of the optimal path hinges on restrictions that are already satised if a
well-dened laissez-faire equilibrium exists. In particular, given condition (31), the optimal
investment rate  ? is strictly positive only if  > . This condition is necessarily met in the
limiting case of logarithmic preferences,  ! 1.
The centralized allocation chosen by the social planner di¤ers from the laissez-faire equi-
librium in two respects. First, comparing Proposition 2 with expressions (25)-(29), it follows
that the optimal growth rate di¤ers from the laissez-faire growth rate in (28), and the growth
gap is in favor of the centralized economy:
_Y ? (t)
Y ? (t)
 
_Y F (t)
Y F (t)
=
1


 (1  )2 +    (1  )  
   

> 0: (39)
This result is intuitive: since the social planner internalizes the externality contained in  (t),
the market interest rate iF falls short of the social return to R&D. As a consequence, the
laissez-faire economy under-invests into R&D activity: from (26) and (36), the optimal invest-
ment rate is higher than the laissez-faire rate:
 ?    F =  (1  )
2 +  [ (1  )  ]
 (   ) > 0:
The second asymmetry between the social optimum and the decentralized equilibrium is that
the optimal quantity of each intermediate product generally di¤ers from the equilibrium quan-
tity sold to nal producers by monopolists under laissez-faire conditions. As shown in the
Appendix, the optimal path is characterized by
x? (t) =



  (   1) + 
 (   )
 1
1 
L0e
`t: (40)
Comparing (40) with the equilibrium quantity under laissez-faire (30), we obtain
x? (t)
xF (t)
=

1

  (   1) + 
 (   )
 1
1 
: (41)
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In general, whether the right hand side of (41) is above or below unity depends on the whole
set of parameters. This ambiguity does not arise in the MS-model, where the equilibrium
quantities are always below the optimal level. The root of this di¤erence in results is that, in
the present model, the combination of monopolistic pricing and R&D spillovers gives rise to
two contrasting e¤ects, as claried below.
4.2 Rent-E¤ect and Reallocation
The reason for the ambiguous sign in the gap x?   xF is as follows. On the one hand, the
equilibrium quantity of each intermediate under laissez-faire tends to be reduced relative to
the optimum because of the usual rent e¤ect : monopolistic behavior in the intermediate sector
implies a positive mark-up between prices and marginal costs, which tends to restrict supply
and thereby the equilibrium quantity xF relative to perfectly competitive environments that
is, the phenomenon arising in the standard MS-model. On the other hand, di¤erently from
the MS-model, the laissez-faire economy tends to under-invest in R&D activity due to the
externalities in the research sector: private agents fail to recognize the linear relation between
investment rates and growth rates of varieties i.e., equation (18) so that the laissez-faire
investment rate ZF =Y F is ine¢ ciently low. While going to the detriment of R&D activity, this
misallocation of resources also implies a greater share of output available for consumption and
for producing intermediates: this reallocation e¤ect tends to increase the equilibrium quantity
of each intermediate under laissez-faire, contrasting the rent e¤ect. The bottom-line is that,
in the current model, we have xF < x? if and only if the rent-e¤ect dominates. When the
rent-e¤ect is dominated by the reallocation e¤ect, instead, the laissez-faire economy displays
production overshooting in the intermediate sector: xF exceeds the optimal level x? due to
under-investment in R&D.
Before addressing in detail the question of which e¤ect dominates, it is instructive to
corroborate the above reasoning by comparing the determination of optimal and laissez-faire
quantities of intermediates in the MS-model and in the Linear-Rate model. First, consider
the laissez-faire quantities. Since all the assumptions of section 2.1 hold in both frameworks,
the laissez-faire equilibrium condition on x (j) is the same: the marginal productivity of the
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intermediate equals the marginal cost plus the mark-up,5
@Y LF (t)
@xLF (j; t)
= " 

1 +
1  


for each j 2 [0; J ] : (42)
Next, consider the socially optimal quantities that characterize the MS-model and the Linear-
Rate model.
Socially optimal quantity in the MS-model. As shown in section 2.2, the MS-model assumes
_J (t) = Z (t). Plugging in this expression the aggregate constraint (16) and technology (1),
we have
_J (t)
1

= L (t)1 
Z J(t)
0
x (j; t) dj   C (t)  
Z J(t)
0
x (j; t) dj: (43)
Equation (43) is the dynamic constraint of the social problem in the MS-model (cf. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004: p.298). It is immediately apparent that, maximizing (32) subject to
(43), the rst-order condition with respect to x (j) implies
@YMS (t)
@xMS (j; t)
= " for each j 2 [0; J ] ; (44)
where the superscript MSindicates optimal quantities in the Multi-sector Scale Model. Equa-
tion (44) is the standard e¢ ciency condition that would arise if intermediates were produced
by perfectly competitive rms. Comparing (44) and (42), it follows that the MS-model only
exhibits the rent-e¤ect: under laissez-faire, equilibrium quantities tend to be unambiguously
lower than in the optimum due to monopolistic pricing. This is the reason why nal producers
should be subsidized in the MS-model.
Socially optimal quantity in the Linear-Rate model. Results change in our Linear-Rate
model because the planner optimizes the rate of R&D investment  (t) on the basis of the
accumulation law _J (t) =J (t) = Z (t) =Y (t), which di¤ers from the one recognized by private
agents. Maximizing (32) subject to (33)-(34), the rst-order condition with respect to x (j)
becomes6
(1   ? (t)) @Y
? (t)
@x? (j; t)
=  for each j 2 [0; J ] : (45)
Condition (45) shows that, when the growth rate of varieties obeys the linear-rate law (18),
each intermediate input should be produced up to the point where its marginal cost equals the
5Equation (42) directly follows from setting b = 0 in equations (3) and (4).
6Equation (45) is used in the derivation of (A11): see Appendix.
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un-invested fraction of its marginal product. This result clearly di¤ers from the one obtained
in the standard MS-model that is, condition (44) due to the presence of the investment rate.
The interpretation is the following. If private agents recognized the role of the investment rate
 (t) in enhancing future consumption possibilities, they would restrict the fraction of current
output devoted to producing intermediates and set x (j) below the quantity that equates the
current marginal productivity, @Y=@x (j), to the current production cost, . Because this
internalization does not take place in the laissez-faire economy, the equilibrium quantity tends
to be increased by the presence of R&D externalities.
The above analysis conrms that, in the Linear-Rate model, xLF (j) is generally sub-
optimal for two independent reasons: the rent-e¤ect and the reallocation e¤ect. The fact that
these mechanisms push in opposite directions is immediately evident from (42) and (45): the
ratio between the marginal productivities is
@Y LF
@xLF (j)
=
@Y ?
@x? (j)
=
1   ?

;
where the right hand side determines whether xLF R x?. Indeed, by (36), the term (1   ?) =
coincides with the term in square brackets in (41). Since this term may be above or below
unity, the laissez-faire quantity xLF may exceed or fall short of the optimal quantity x?. It
must be stressed, however, that the gap xLF   x? does have unambiguous sign in the polar
case of logarithmic preferences, as shown in the next section.
5 Optimal Policy
In the Linear-Rate model, the interplay between monopolistic pricing and R&D externalities
generates contrasting e¤ects on the equilibrium quantity of intermediate inputs. The question
that naturally arises is which of the two e¤ects is stronger. If the rent-e¤ect dominates, we
have x?=xF > 1, and the general policy prescription is similar to that of the MS-model: as
the equilibrium quantity is ine¢ ciently low, the optimal policy consists of subsidizing nal
producers in order to restore e¢ ciency. Instead, if the reallocation e¤ect dominates, we have
x?=xF < 1, and the policy prescription is reversed: due to externalities in research, the equi-
librium quantity of intermediates is ine¢ ciently high and the optimal policy consists of taxing
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nal producers in order to restrict the output share devoted to intermediatesproduction and
to free resources for R&D investment.
For the sake of exposition, the relative magnitude of the rent-e¤ect and the reallocation
e¤ect is rstly analyzed in the polar case of logarithmic preferences, which substantially sim-
plies the analysis. The interesting result is that, letting  = 1, the reallocation e¤ect always
dominates. In the more general case  6= 1, there exists a critical value  > 1 below which the
same result holds. Consequently, the rent-e¤ect may (but does not necessarily) dominate if 
strictly exceeds unity.
5.1 Logarithmic Preferences
Notice that, from (26), the existence of a laissez-faire equilibrium with  F > 0 requires
that parameters satisfy inequality (31). Now suppose that preferences are logarithmic. When
 = 1, expression (41) reduces to x? (t) =xF (t) = f= [ (1  )]g 11  . In view of the existence
condition (31), it follows that x? (t) < xF (t). Hence, logarithmic preferences imply that the
reallocation e¤ect dominates: the socially-optimal quantity of each intermediate input is lower
than the equilibrium quantity attained under laissez-faire. This implies that, contrary to the
prediction of the MS-model, the optimal policy consists of taxing nal producers. More
precisely, dene the optimal policy as the set of instruments (a; b; f (t)) which decentralizes
the optimal allocation i.e., the allocation characterized by (35)-(40) in the decentralized
economy with public intervention i.e., the economy described by (19)-(24). The comparison
between Propositions 1 and 2 yields the following result:
Proposition 3 If  = 1, the optimal subsidy rate on nal producers is strictly negative, and
equal to
b =      (1  )

< 0: (46)
The optimal subsidy to R&D investment is
a =
 (1  )3 +  [ (1  )  ]
 (1  )2 > 0 (47)
(Proof: see Appendix).
As noted before, the fact that R&D activity must be subsidized  i.e., result (47)  is
not surprising. The novel result of Proposition 3 is expression (46)  i.e., the fact that the
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purchase of intermediate goods by nal producers must be taxed, not subsidized. Since  = 1
is commonly regarded as the polar case in theoretical optimization models, Proposition 3
suggests that the reallocation e¤ect dominates in a wider range of cases. We address this
point below.
5.2 The General Case
When  6= 1, the optimal policy is characterized by the optimal subsidy rates (see Appendix)
b = b =    (   1) +    (   )
 (   1) +  ; (48)
a = a =
 (   ) (1  )2 +  [ (1  )  ]
 (1  ) (   ) > 0: (49)
Expressions (48)-(49) show that, while the optimal subsidy to R&D rms a remains positive
for any value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the sign of the optimal subsidy to
nal producers b depends on the value of . In particular, the derivative
@b
@
=    (1  )  
[ (   1) + ]2 > 0
ensures that b is strictly increasing in .7 On the basis of these results, we can prove the
following
Proposition 4 The sign of the optimal subsidy rate to nal producers is determined by the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Dening the critical level
  1 +  (1  )  
 (1  ) > 1; (50)
we have b < 0 if  <  and b > 0 if  >  (Proof: see Appendix).
Proposition 4 shows that whether the reallocation e¤ect dominates the rent e¤ect crucially
depends on the value of . If the elasticity parameter is below the critical level , the real-
location e¤ect dominates: the laissez-faire equilibrium quantity of intermediates exceeds the
socially optimal one, and the optimal policy consists of taxing nal producers. Viceversa, if 
is above the threshold value , the rent e¤ect dominates and scal authorities should subsidize
nal producers. Indeed, it can be easily veried that the special case  =  is associated with
7Recall that  (1  )   > 0 is necessary to have a positive optimal investment rate in  ? > 0 in (36).
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x? (t) = xF (t) (see expression (41) above). Since  > 1, the logarithmic case  = 1 necessarily
belongs to the scenario  < .
The general insight of this subsection is that the reallocation e¤ect is weaker the higher is
. In fact,  determines whether, in response to a variation in the interest rate, consumers are
more willing to smooth the consumption prole or to postpone consumption. When  < 1,
the reallocation e¤ect is stronger: if agents knew that the productivity of R&D investment
were higher than the level perceived by atomistic rms, they would decide to invest more
into R&D activity, and the additional investment would be relatively high because  < 1
implies that the willingness to postpone consumption overcomes the willingness to smooth
the consumption prole. This explains why, in the case  < 1, a benevolent planner would
unambiguously choose to tax nal producers and devote more and more resources to R&D.
When  > 1, instead, the reallocation e¤ect arising in the laissez-faire economy is weaker: if
agents knew the true rate of return they would still adjust savings and invest more into R&D
activity, but the additional investment would be relatively limited because  > 1 implies
that the willingness to smooth the consumption prole dominates the willingness to postpone
consumption. Given this, it is possible that the rent-e¤ect dominates when  > 1. If this is
the case, the optimal policy is similar to the one predicted by the MS-model i.e., subsidize
nal producers although the optimal subsidy rate is still reduced by the reallocation e¤ect,
which does not exist in the MS-model.
6 Conclusion
An established result of the endogenous growth literature is that the laissez-faire equilibria
arising in expanding-varieties models are sub-optimal due to the rent-e¤ect: in order to obtain
a positive mark-up, monopolists restrict the supply of intermediate inputs; consequently, the
equilibrium quantity of each intermediate is ine¢ ciently low. The policy implication is that
nal producers should be subsidized in order to restore e¢ ciency. This result holds in multi-
sector models displaying scale e¤ects, where the instantaneous increase in the number of
varieties is proportional to the absolute level of R&D expenditures. It is known that scale
e¤ects can be eliminated by postulating a di¤erent dynamic law, whereby the growth rate of
intermediatesvarieties is proportional to the investment propensity. This paper has shown
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that an additional consequence of assuming the linear-rate law is that the optimal subsidy to
nal producers becomes strictly negative in a wide range of cases. The reason is that linear-rate
laws can be reconciled with zero-prots in the R&D sectors by assuming spillovers from past
innovations, but this assumption substantially alters the welfare properties of decentralized
equilibria. Under laissez-faire, the economy under-invests into R&D activity because agents
fail to internalize research spillovers. Since under-investment in R&D implies greater shares
of output devoted to consumption and to the production of intermediates, the equilibrium
quantity of intermediate inputs is a¤ected by two opposing forces: it tends to be reduced
by monopolistic pricing but, at the same time, tends to be increased by the misallocation
of resources in disfavor of R&D activity. Di¤erently from the standard multi-sector model
with scale e¤ects, the equilibrium quantity of each di¤erentiated input under laissez-faire
may be higher or lower than in the optimum: if the reallocation e¤ect dominates the rent-
e¤ect, there is overshooting in intermediatesproduction. Clearly, if this is the case, the policy
prescription is reversed: the decentralization of the the social optimum requires nal producers
to be taxed, instead of being subsidized. The interesting result is that the reallocation e¤ect
surely dominates in the polar case of logarithmic preferences, as well as in all cases in which
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1=, is above unity. When   1, the overshooting
result is reinforced and the optimal tax on nal producers is strictly positive. When  > 1,
instead, it possible that the elasticity of substitution overcomes a critical threshold whereby the
reallocation e¤ect is weakened and dominated by the rent-e¤ect. In this case, intermediates
production is ine¢ ciently low and the nal sector should be subsidized although the optimal
subsidy rate will be generally smaller than that predicted by the MS-model.
Appendix
The Household Problem: derivation of (14). The current-value Hamiltonian associated
to the household problem is
H = u (c) +  [(i  `)n+ w   c  f ] ;
where  is the dynamic multiplier associated to (12). The rst-order conditions Hc = 0 and
Hn =    _ yield uc =  and _= =  + `   i, from which _c=c =  1 (i    `). Plugging
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_= = + `  i into the transversality condition
lim
t!1 (t)n (t) e
 t = 0
we obtain limt!1 n (t) e 
R t
0 (i(s) `)ds = 0. Substituting n (t) = N (t) =L (t), and L (t) =
L (0) e`t together with N (t) = J (t)V (t), we obtain limt!1 J (t)V (t) e 
R t
0 i(s)ds = 0, which
implies (14).
Derivation of (16). Substituting n (t) = J (t)V (t) =L (t) in (12) we obtain
_J (t)V (t) + _V (t) J (t) = i (t) J (t)V (t) + w (t)L (t)  C (t)  f (t)L (t)
where C (t)  L (t) c (t) is aggregate consumption. Plugging _J (t) =  (t)Z (t) from (8),
V (t) = 1= [ (t) (1 + a)] from (9), and _V (t) = i (t)V (t)   (t) from (10), we obtain
Z (t) (1 + a) 1 = w (t)L (t) + J (t) (t)  C (t)  f (t)L (t) ;
Substituting  (t) = p (t)x (t)   x (t) and recalling that (2)-(3) imply Y (t) + bJ (t)x (t) =
L (t)w (t) + p (t) J (t)x (t), we obtain
Z (t) (1 + a) 1 = Y (t)  J (t) x (t)  C (t) + bJ (t)x (t)  f (t)L:
Substituting bJ (t)x (t)  f (t)L (t) =  az (t) from the government budget (11) and recalling
that z (t) (1 + a) = Z (t), we obtain the aggregate budget constraint (16).
Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that the equilibrium relations imply8
J (t)x (t)
Y (t)
= 2= (  b) ; (A1)
Z (t)
Y (t)
= 1  C (t)
Y (t)
  
  b
2; (A2)
_Y (t)
Y (t)
= `+
_J (t)
J (t)
: (A3)
Next consider (10): substituting  (t) from (6) and V (t) = [ (t) (1 + a)] 1 = Y (t) = [ (1 + a) J (t)]
from (9) and (17), and using (A1) to eliminate J (t)x (t) =Y (t), we have
i (t) =  (1 + a)  (1  ) +
_V (t)
V (t)
: (A4)
8Equation (A1) follows from (5) and (7). Plugging (A1) in (16) yields (A2). Time-di¤erentiation of (7)
implies (A3).
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From (9) and (17), we have _V =V = ( _Y =Y )   ( _J=J), and from (A3) this implies _V =V = `.
Expression (A4) thus yields result (21). Setting the consumption propensity   C=Y and
the investment rate   Z=Y , equation (A2) reads  (t) = 1    (t)    b2. Plugging this
result in (18) yields
_J (t) =J (t) =  (t) = 

1   (t)  
  b
2

; (A5)
which, combined with (A3), implies
_Y (t) =Y (t) = `+ 

1   (t)  
  b
2

: (A6)
From (15) and (21), consumption growth equals
_C (t) =C (t) = `+
1

[ (1 + a)  (1  )  ] : (A7)
From (A6)-(A7), the equilibrium growth rate of the consumption propensity _= = ( _C=C) 
( _Y =Y ) must satisfy
_ (t) = (t) =  (t) +
1

[ (1 + a)  (1  )  ]  

1  
  b
2

; (A8)
This dynamic relation has a unique xed point
ss = 1  
  b
2   1

[(1 + a)  (1  )  (=)] : (A9)
which is dynamically unstable9. Hence, the only equilibrium satisfying (A8) is E (t) = ss in
each t 2 [0;1) because  (t) 6= ss at any t would generate explosive dynamics  (t) ! 1
that imply the violation in nite time of either the aggregate constraint (16) or of the non-
negativity of consumption. This result proves (19). Since E (t) = ss in each t 2 [0;1), the
investment rate is constant as well: from (A2) we obtain  (t) equal to
 E = 1  
  b
2   E = 1

[(1 + a)  (1  )  (=)] (A10)
in each t 2 [0;1). From (A1), (A2) and (16), constant propensities to consume and to invest
imply that Y E (t) grows at the same rate as CE (t) and ZE (t), given by the Keynes-Ramsey
rule (A7), which proves result (22). Expression (23) can be equivalently obtained from (A3)
or (A5). 
9The derivative of the right hand side of (A8) with respect to  (t) is  > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The Hamiltonian associated to the social problem is
H = Lu (c) + 

(1   )L1 
Z J
0
x (j) dj   
Z J
0
x (j) dj   Lc

+ J ;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the static constraint (33),10 and  is the
dynamic multiplier associated to the dynamic constraint (34). Notice that the rst-order
conditions with respect to each x (j) read
 (1   )L1 x (j) 1 =  (A11)
for each j 2 [0; J ], which implies symmetry across varieties. As a consequence, the maximiza-
tion is equivalently carried over by imposing symmetry ex-ante - that is, setting x (j) = x for
each j 2 [0; J ] in each instant, and using the modied Hamiltonian
L = Lu (c) +  (1   )L1 Jx   Jx  Lc+ J ;
where the control variables are (c; x;  ), and the rst-order condition with respect to x will
incorporate (A11) for each j 2 [0; J ]. The necessary conditions for optimality read
Lc = 0 ! uc (t) =  (t) ; (A12)
Lx = 0 !  (1   (t))Y (t) = J (t)x (t) ; (A13)
L = 0 !  (t)Y (t) =  (t) J (t); (A14)
together with the co-state equation LJ =   _, which implies
 (1   ) (Y=J)  x+  = (+ `)  _: (A15)
The optimal dynamics of consumption are obtained as follows. Plugging (A13) in the aggregate
constraint (16), and using the denitions  (t)  C (t) =Y (t) and  (t)  Z (t) =Y (t), we
obtain
 (t) = (1   (t)) (1  ) : (A16)
10An equivalent specication consists of eliminating  by plugging constraint (33) directly into the instanta-
neous utility function as u (c) = u
nh
(1   )L1  R J
0
x (j) dj    R J
0
x (j) dj   Lc
i
=L
o
. Obviously, results do
not change.
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Plugging (A16) back in (A13), we have 1  (t)Y (t) = J (t)x (t), which can be time-
di¤erentiated to obtain
_C (t)
C (t)
=
_J (t)
J (t)
+
_x (t)
x (t)
: (A17)
Since Y = L1 Jx implies _Y =Y = (1  ) ` + ( _J=J) +  ( _x=x), we can substitute _x=x =
 1
h
( _Y =Y )  ( _J=J)  (1  ) `
i
in (A17) to obtain
_Y (t)
Y (t)
= 
_C (t)
C (t)
+ (1  )
_J (t)
J (t)
+ (1  ) `: (A18)
which is useful for future reference. Using (A12) to eliminate  (t) from (A14) and (A15), we
respectively obtain
uc (t)Y (t) =  (t) J (t); (A19)
_ (t) = (t) = + `   [1   (1   (t))] : (A20)
Recalling that uc = c , time-di¤erentiation of (A19) and substitution of (A20) imply
_c (t)
c (t)
=
1

(
 [1   (1   (t))]    `+
_Y (t)
Y (t)
 
_J (t)
J (t)
)
: (A21)
Substituting _c=c = ( _C=C)  ` and using (A18) to eliminate _Y =Y from (A21), we get
_C (t)
C (t)
(   ) =  [1   (1   )]  + (   ) `  
_J (t)
J (t)
: (A22)
Equation (A22) implies two possible cases, depending on whether  =  or  6= . We claim
that  >  must hold in a well-dened equilibrium, and verify this claim later. Letting  > ,
result (A22) implies
_C (t)
C (t)
=
1
   
(
 [1   (1   )]    
_J (t)
J (t)
)
+ `; (A23)
which can be substituted in (A18) to obtain
_Y (t)
Y (t)
=
1
   
(
 [1   (1   )]  + [(1  )   ]
_J (t)
J (t)
)
+ `: (A24)
Taking the di¤erence between (A23) and (A24), we have
_C (t)
C (t)
 
_Y (t)
Y (t)
=
1  
   
(
 [1   (1   )]    
_J (t)
J (t)
)
;
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where we can substitute _= to the left hand side and, from (34), _J=J =  , obtaining
_ (t)
 (t)
=
1  
    f [1   (1   (t))]     (t)g :
From (A16), we can replace 1  (t) = (t)1  as well as  (t) = 1  (t)1  in the above expression
to get
_ (t)
 (t)
=  (t) +
1  
    [ (1  )  ] : (A25)
The xed point of (A25) is
 = (1  ) 

1   (1  )  
 (   )

= (1  )   (   1) + 
 (   ) : (A26)
Since  > 0, relation (A25) is dynamically unstable and can only be satised along optimal
paths with bounded propensities by setting ? (t) =  in each t 2 [0;1), which proves (35).
From (35) and (A16), we obtain (36). Since the necessary condition for an equilibrium in the
laissez-faire economy is  (1  ) > , we have  (1  ) > : from (36), this implies that the
condition
 >  (A27)
must hold in order to have, also in the social optimum, a well-dened steady state with positive
investment rate  ? (t) > 0. Plugging (36) in (34), we have (38). A constant ? (t) implies
_C=C = _Y =Y in (A18) and thus _Y (t) =Y (t) = _J (t) =J (t) + `, which can be substituted into
(A21) together with _c=c = ( _C=C)   ` to obtain (37). It is easy to prove that  =  does
not allow us to obtain a well-dened equilibrium: going back to (A22) and setting  = , we
obtain a growth rate of J (t) equal to
_J(t)
J(t)

=
= 1 f [1   (1   )]  g, but combining this
result with the accumulation law (34) yields an indeterminate investment rate  . 
Derivation of (40). From (A13), the optimal quantity of each intermediate product is
determined by
x? (t) =
 (1   ?)

Y (t)
J (t)
=
 (1   ?)

L (t)1  x (t) :
Solving for x? (t) we obtain x? (t) =

 (1   ?)
 1
1  L (t), where we can substitute  ? =
(1 ) 
( ) from (36) to obtain (40).
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to obtain an optimal quantity of intermediate inputs,
the scal authority must set the subsidy rate to nal producers, b, in order to make xE (t)
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coinciding with x? (t). From (24) and (40), having xE (t) = x? (t) in each t requires setting
b = b =    (   1) +    (   )
 (   1) +  :
Letting  = 1 in the above expression, we obtain (46), where b is strictly negative from
(46). In order to decentralize the optimal growth rate and the optimal propensities to invest
and consume, the scal authorities must set a = a in order to equalize the growth rates
_Y E=Y E = _Y ?=Y ?. From (22) and (37), having _Y E (t) =Y E (t) = _Y ? (t) =Y ? (t) in each t
requires setting
a = a =
 (   ) (1  )2 +  [ (1  )  ]
 (1  ) (   ) > 0:
Letting  = 1 in the above expression, we obtain (47). Since a = a also implies an optimal
rate of return as well as an optimal propensities to consume in the market economy, i.e.
E = ? and  E =  ?, the optimal policy consists of a = a and b = b, with f (t) =
(1=L (t)) [az (t) + bJ (t)x (t)] determined by the government budget constraint (11). 
Derivation of (48)-(49). Results (48)-(49) are derived in the Proof of Proposition 3
above.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recalling that  (1  )   > 0 is necessary to have a positive
optimal investment rate in  ? > 0 in (36), expression (48) implies that b = 0 if and only if
 (   1) +    (   ) = 0;
which, after some algebra, reduces to
 = 1 +
 (1  )  
 (1  )  .
Since @b=@ > 0, we necessarily have b < 0 for  <  and b > 0 for  > . 
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